

EUROPEAN HELICOPTER ASSOCIATION

EVALUATION REPORT ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN

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*'Protecting the interests
of the rotorcraft
Operators'*



OVERVIEW

- The following slides collect our goals and highlight some findings of reading the final report
- They are meant as points for discussion
- First, we outline our goals and assumptions
- Then we list some parts from the report that we feel would support further discussion
- Finally, we indicate what solution we would see to solve the problem of administrative burdens



OUR GOALS

We want to maintain / improve our current level of safety while realizing a significant reduction of regulatory prescriptions and its associated administrative burden.

- Compliance has taken over everything. We want to shift the current main focus on compliance to one of SAFETY
- We want to reduce economic pressure on the operator allowing them to say NO to riskier but maybe higher paying types of operation
- We want to define a new type of small operator with significant reduction in regulatory requirements as already proposed in report
- We want to have a holistic approach to administrative burdens for helicopter operators. This means that CAMO and Part-145, as applicable, need to be included in the scope of this work as well



OUR ASSUMPTIONS

- Compliance has taken over everything. This leads to a potentially unsafe situation because putting efforts into complying with the law draws resources from safety relevant topics. The top 6 admin burdens identified in the report are mostly for maintaining compliance. The paradigm that more regulation leads to a higher levels of safety is simply wrong.
- The majority of the regulatory requirements are not understood by the operators. This is due to a lack of English language competence (only IR are translated into other languages, AMC are not) as well as the complex legal structure with numerous cross-references, exceptions and dependencies and difficult to understand legalese.
- During audits, the national authorities only check compliance topics. This is due to several reasons:
 - When EASA audits NAA, the focus is on compliance as well. So compliance needs to be fulfilled with the respective operators
 - NAA inspectors often have no practical experience in the industry leading them to avoid concrete discussions regarding impact on operations and safety




POINTS FOR DISCUSSION FROM THE REPORT

Objective of the evaluation report on administrative burden for small size helicopter operators

- To support this objective, the roadmap strives to identify and reduce the administrative burden and the costs for the helicopter operators, so they can focus on safety-related tasks and improve their performance.



BURDEN OVERVIEW



17 out of 26 points are due to a focus on compliance and documentation requirements



MAJOR ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED: COMPLIANCE = SAFETY?

- Compliance does not mean it is a safe operation
- Compliance means that all laws have been implemented. Laws by themselves do not create a safety ethos.
- People, processes and the following safety culture do.
- The paradigm that more regulation leads to higher levels of safety is wrong.
- Safety cannot be increased by just more laws

Ideal world:

- Focus of authority during audits on safe procedures. These are usually defined beyond the scope of IR and AMC.



ESTIMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

What about the financial impact relative to the size of the company?
Semi-scientific formula: Is cause and effect adequately addressed?
What about a company performing numerous operations?
CAMO as part of CAT Ops?

$$\text{Administrative effort}_T = \sum_{i=1}^{26} \frac{F_i * D_i}{Q_i}$$

Where **T** stands for the types of operation (i.e. CAT, SPO, NCC and Training)

Where **F** stands for the annual frequency of the administrative cluster *i* within a type of operation

Where **D** stands for the (average) duration to comply with administrative cluster *i* within a type of operation

Where **Q** stands for the number of operators that responded to administrative cluster *i* within a type of operation



NUMBER OF RULES TO BE FOLLOWED

- “The sheer number of identified rules (248), which have a potential information obligation (as identified in Annex IX), makes it very difficult to get feedback at the level of all individual rules. In order to be able to collect and analyse regarding the administrative costs of small size helicopter operators, we have categorised the 248 rules in 26 clusters. At this level of 26 categories, we have structured the survey questionnaire. In order to retrieve information at the level of individual rules, we have used open questions results from the survey, as well as results from interviews.”

The report identifies one key problem: The sheer number of identified rules
Complexity and interdependencies of rules make it very hard to understand what is required
One important aspect is left out: Different languages and the lack of translation of AMCs.




NEW OPERATOR PROFILE SHOULD COVER THESE TYPES EXISTING OPERATORS

Table 3 Typical profile of a small helicopter operator in Europe

Generic information	Typical operator 1	Typical operator 2	Typical operator 3
CAT		50%	25%
SPO	100%	50%	25%
Training			50%
Total number of helicopter ⁷	2 - 3	2 - 3	2 - 3
Total FTE	5 - 8	5 - 8	7 - 10

Regulation should try to identify major risks inherent in these operations and then develop regulation addressing this type of operation.

- “From the exploratory interviews it became clear that managers and nominated persons at small helicopter operators typically combine operational, managerial and administrative duties. They typically do not record the amount of time spent on administrative tasks, and the time spent on those tasks also varies, depending on the time needed for the other functions. Managers and nominated persons of small helicopter operators typically consider the regulatory system to be complex and in their daily activities work according to company procedures. Although these company procedures comply with the requirements, the managers and nominated persons are not familiar with details of the requirements.”



ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORT AS SIGNIFICANT DROVER OF COSTS

What are the costs of these requirements?
Why are CAMO / Part-145 not included?
It is the sum of all these requirements that needs to be accounted for.

Table 4 Assessment of administrative effort per year per type of operation – key findings

Type of operation	Total (in hours)	Total (in FTE)
Commercial Air Transport (CAT)	4.014	2,08
Specialised Operations (SPO)	3.662	1,90
Non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (NCC)	N/A*	N/A*
Training	4.933	2,56

* The number of responses for NCC operations is too low to derive representative statistical results




BURDENS FOR COMBINED OPERATORS

Table 5 Assessment of administrative effort for three typical small helicopter operators in Europe

Generic information		Typical operator 1	Typical operator 2	Typical operator 3
	CAT		50%	25%
	SPO	100%	50%	25%
	Training			50%
Administrative effort (measured in FTE)	CAT		1,04	0,52
	SPO	1,90	0,95	0,47
	Training			1,28
	Total	1,90	1,99	2,27

How do you recoup these costs? These people do nothing for revenues.



ISSUES: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO TABLES?

Table 4 Assessment of administrative effort per year per type of operation – key findings

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* The number of responses for NCC operations is too low to derive representative statistical results

Table 6 Assessment administrative burden per year per type of operation– key findings

Section	Total (in hours)	Total (in FTE)
Commercial Air Transport (CAT)	1.394	0,72
Specialised Operations (SPO)	1.290	0,67
Non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (NCC)	N/A*	N/A*
Training	1.716	0,89

* The number of responses for NCC operations is too low to derive representative statistical results

If we understand correctly the bottom table takes out burdens that are part of Business as usual.

Would this be acceptable?
What are the consequences?



OVERVIEW

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
Table 7 Assessment of administrative burden for three typical small helicopter operators in Europe

Generic information		Typical operator 1	Typical operator 2	Typical operator 3
	CAT		50%	25%
	SPO	100%	50%	25%
	Training			50%
Administrative burden (measured in FTE)	CAT		0,36	0,18
	SPO	0,67	0,33	0,17
	Training			0,44
	Total	0,67	0,70	0,79

If we understand correctly the bottom table takes out burdens that are part of Business as usual.
Would this be acceptable?
What are the consequences?



OPINION OF INTERVIEWEES IN WHICH AREAS ADMIN COULD BE REDUCED WITHOUT LOOSING LEVEL OF SAFETY



Great starting point



ISSUES: HOURS ARE NOT THE ONLY COST FACTOR



- What about costs for using the helicopter and loss of income due to absence of crew?
- Assumption 1 hr flight with AS-350 costs 1'600 EUR, 1 hr crew 40 EUR. That is a factor of 40.

Table 9 Selected administrative requirements (based upon administrative burden)

Section	Administrative requirements	Administrative burden (in hours)				
		CAT	SPO	NCC	Training	Total
4.6.1.	Management system as a whole	170	162	25	119	135
4.6.2.	Record keeping, manuals and documentation	143	78	18	N/A**	124
4.6.3.	Application for an AOC, SPA, authorisation or declaration	141	122	128	149	123
4.6.4.	Establishing (specific) procedures/checklists	102	105	N/A*	148	87
4.6.5.	Managing and applying for changes	103	83	44	80	72
4.6.6.	Checking and maintaining personnel compliance	33	75	N/A*	23	68
4.6.7.	Maintenance / Check flights	67	68	169	39	58
4.6.8.	Audits from the competent authority	76	61	N/A*	110	57
4.6.9.	Establishing mass- and balance data	56	59	N/A*	56	56
4.6.10.	Internal audits	57	72	N/A*	24	53
4.6.11.	Occurrence reporting	46	59	27	75	52
4.6.12.	Training and checking	29	57	N/A*	26	51

* The number of responses for NCC operations is too low to derive representative statistical results

** The number of responses for Training operations is too low to derive representative statistical results

ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL

Great intention to have one set of rules for commercial operations. Reality, however, is much more complex.

- “Many operators have expressed the opinion, either in the interview or in the survey, that especially the requirements for the Safety Management System (SMS) are suited to large operators of fixed wing aircraft. Having the same requirements for small (helicopter) operators result in a disproportional amount of administrative activities.”
- “Operators have stated that they spend so much time on documentation related to the management system that safety related operational tasks are in tribulation. Additionally, operators of small helicopters pointed out that the national competent authority spend a significant part of inspection audits on checking the paperwork related to the management system. The operators fear that in this way the national competent authorities lose sight of what actually happens in the operations where the real risks occur.”



ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS (P. 58)

- “First and foremost, almost all respondents of the survey and interviewed organisations mentioned that the frequency of changes to the regulations is high. This is considered problematic for two reasons:”
 - “A significant administrative effort is required to keep track of all changes in the regulation and to determine whether the regulatory change is applicable.”
 - “The updates of the regulation require frequent changes to the manuals. Adding to this is the need to have the manuals approved by the NAA after the change.”
 - “Different interpretation of EASA rules by different member states is problematic for organisations that operate in multiple member states. Quite some time is spent by the operators in corresponding with the various authorities to get this sorted. In the eyes of the operators this is incomprehensible, and does not contribute at all to aviation safety.”



ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS (P. 58)

- “Several survey respondents indicated that there are other requirements (not obtained in the initial requirement list) that are perceived as particularly burdensome. The following other requirements are retrieved from the survey, yet are considered outside of the scope of this study as they relate to other types of regulation”:
 - “Asking for authorisation in order to fly below the minimum safe altitudes as defined in SERA Regulation”;
 - Asking for permits of a maintenance facility;
 - Missing Flight Duty Period (FDP) regulation for CAT helicopter operations as information from national labour law, subpart Q and FTL is currently being combined;
 - Requirement to produce and approve a syllabus for every variant of an ATO operation (even when OSD is available);
 - The exams are being perceived as burdensome due to the number and timeframe (within 18 months);”



POINTS TO BE ADDED

We believe these points should be reexamined and added

- Reduce requirements for EFB, electronic data processing, etc. Techlog (see p.60)
- Type Ratings and variants. Why are all helicopter types? PC-12 is in a class, R-22 is a type!
- CAMO / Part-145
- Risk based. Need to train authorities to look at different things. Need to have practical experience. Currently significant lack of experience with small operators.
- Frequency of regulatory changes
- Miscalculation of economic impact of (new) regulation



PERFORM DETAILED ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN RECOMMENDATION

- In depth analysis to be done as task for the industry delegation



REVIEW ANNEX IX OF RESULTS: REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS OPS AND AIRCREW

- In depth analysis to be done as task for the industry delegation

#	Part	Sub-part	Number	Title	Cat.	Managem ent Safety	Flight associ ated	Person nel records	Other	CAT	SPO	SPA	NCC	NCO
1	ORO	GEN	115	Application for an AOC	1,1	x				x				
2	ORO	AOC	100	Application for an air operator certificate	1,1	x	x			x				
3	ORO	DEC	100	Declaration	1,1	x					x		x	
4	ORO	SPO	110	Authorisation of high risk commercial specialised operations	1,1	x					x			
5	CAT	GEN. MPA	155	Carriage of weapons of war and munitions of war	1,1	x				x				
6	CAT	POL.H	420	Helicopter operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested area	1,1	x				x				
7	SPA	GEN	105	Application for a specific approval	1,1	x				x	x	x	x	x
8	SPO	SPEC. HESL O	110	Transportation of dangerous goods	1,1	x					x			
9	ORO	GEN	135	Changes related to an AOC holder	1,2	x				x				
10	ORO	SPO	115	Changes	1,2	x					x			
11	SPA	GEN	115	Changes to a specific approval	1,2	x				x	x	x	x	x




WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR CHANGES

- Define a new category of operator with an associated intermediate level of required safety management. In this case, the related requirements should be defined in consultation with existing operators to take advantage of practical experience in the application of the requirements/guidance. (p.44 of report)



ICAO OPERATOR DEFINITION



THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION

